Redistribution between rich and poor countries by Stewart, Miranda
 T H E  A U S T R A L I A N  N A T I O N A L  U N I V E R S I T Y  
 
 
Crawford School of Public Policy  
 
TTPI 
Tax and Transfer Policy Institute 
 
 
  
TTPI - Working Paper 4/2018 
February 2018 
 
Professor Miranda Stewart 
University of Melbourne Law School and 
Tax and Transfer Policy Institute, The Australian National University 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The topic of redistribution between rich and poor countries opens a can of worms. This 
paper first inquires into what we mean by some of these words and second, considers 
the role of taxation in redistribution. It briefly considers the various modes of 
redistribution to address poverty and inequality, including the role of taxation, within a 
country before turning to consider modes of redistribution between rich and poor 
countries. The paper then turns to consider whether we are asking the right question. 
Should the question, really, be about redistribution between rich and poor people? In an 
increasingly global and digital era, how might we reconsider the role of taxation in 
achieving this? The paper briefly touches on state-based and cosmopolitan theories of 
international distributive justice, before considering whether we need to unpack the very 
concept of the country, nation-state, or government to achieve the transnational 
provision of public goods and redistribution between rich and poor. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The topic of redistribution between rich and poor countries opens a can of worms. Each of 
the words “redistribution”, “between,” “rich,” “poor” and “countries” raises questions about 
meaning, while the topic itself raises numerous philosophical, legal, economic, political and 
administrative questions. If we can establish, first, what we mean by rich and poor countries 
and, second, what we mean by redistribution, we are faced with a third, fundamental question: 
should there be “redistribution” between rich and poor countries at all? If the answer to this 
question is yes, we must inquire, how should or can this be done? More specifically and 
relevantly for this audience, what is the role of taxation (domestic and international) in 
redistribution between rich and poor countries? 
 
There is only scope here to touch very briefly on the moral or philosophical debates about 
distributive justice that underlie these questions.1 On a literal interpretation, “redistribution” 
requires taking from those who have more and giving to those who have less. Applied in a 
national or global context, redistribution typically is intended to address either poverty or 
inequality. The goal of halving absolute poverty was established as a global challenge in the 
Millennium Development Goals. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) take a 
significant step further, identifying Goals of eliminating poverty (Goal 1), gender equality 
(Goal 5), and reducing inequalities (Goal 10) by 2030.2 The SDGs aim to “end poverty, protect 
the planet and ensure prosperity for all” and argue that “everyone needs to do their part: 
governments, the private sector, civil society and people like you”.3 
 
Part 2 discusses what we mean by rich and poor countries, while Part 3 discusses 
redistribution, poverty, inequality and economic growth. Part 4 outlines the various modes of 
redistribution, including the role of taxation, within a country and part 5 does the same for 
current modes of redistribution between rich and poor countries. In Part 6, we turn to consider 
whether we are asking the right question. Should the question, really, be about redistribution 
between rich and poor people? In an increasingly global and digital era, how might we 
reconsider the role of taxation in achieving this? Part 6 explores some possible approaches, 
before Part 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
1. See, e.g. L. Murphy and T. Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice (2002, Oxford 
University Press) for an account of these moral debates in the national context. 
2. UN, Sustainable Development Goals, available at www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-
development-goals/ and UN, Millennium Development Goals, available at www.un.org/millenniumgoals/, 
including Goal 1 (No poverty); Goal 5 (Gender equality) and Goal 10 (Reduced inequalities). 
3. UN, Sustainable Development Goals, supra n. 2. 
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2. Rich and Poor Countries 
 
The standard metric of the richness or poorness of countries is Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) or Gross National Income (GNI), or a slightly more nuanced metric of GDP or GNI per 
capita. The GDP per capita of selected countries is illustrated in Figure 1 for the United 
States, Canada, Korea (Rep.), China, Ghana and Liberia. Figure 2 shows the GDP per capita 
for these countries over the period since 1963, revealing that all these countries have grown 
richer since the 1960s, but some have grown much richer than others. Even after 70 years 
of the post-colonial economic development project that dates from Bretton Woods, there 
remains an enormous gap in GDP between rich and poor countries. 
 
 
The GDP per capita presented in Figures 1 and 2 measures the market value of goods and 
services produced, based on prices (inputs) in the economy, adjusted for population and 
determined from standardized national accounts and income surveys. This measure has 
been criticized as inadequate both for economic management and as a measure of well-
being in a society.4 A country’s GDP per capita fails to account for the household, care and 
subsistence activities in that country, including home childcare, breastfeeding or food growing 
and preparation (all of which are much more widespread in households in poor countries) or 
the value of digital activities such as the internet or social media. It also misses national 
                                                 
 
4. See, for example, J.E. Stiglitz, A. Sen & J.-P. Fitoussi, The measurement of economic performance 
and social progress revisited; Reflections and overview, French Observatory of Economic Conditions: 
Economics Research Center, (2009), available at 
http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/5l6uh8ogmqildh09h4687h53k/resources/wp2009-33.pdf. 
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liabilities and debt; the loss of capital in destruction of infrastructure; the economic costs of 
degradation of the environment and depletion of natural resources. 
 
 
The weaknesses in the measure of GDP per capita have led to the development of a great 
many other indices of wellbeing, or richness/poorness of countries. The United Nations (UN) 
releases various indices that aim to capture diverse information about wellbeing include the 
Human Development Index (HDI), Inequality-adjusted HDI, Gender Inequality Index, Gender 
Development Index and Multidimensional Poverty Index.5 Others have proposed a 
Happiness Index6 and the OECD produces a Better Life Index.7 
 
For our purposes, we do not need to go into detail about these indices, except to observe 
one key result which is relevant to taxation. The indicator of GDP takes account of 
government-produced goods and services by measuring input costs, differently to privately 
produced, or market, goods and services (measured at market prices). Thus, GDP may 
overstate the “richness” of countries where more goods and services are privately provided 
in the market – including the richest country in the world, the United States - compared to 
countries with larger governments and more public provision. Yet the people in countries with 
larger public sectors may be as well, or better off, than those who must pay privately for these 
goods, in spite of the higher tax burdens of the former, in general, which is required to pay 
                                                 
 
5. United Nations Human Development Report Office, International Human Development Indicators 
(UN), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries. 
6. World Happiness Report 2017, available at http://worldhappiness.report/overview/. 
7. OECD, Better Life Index (OECD), available at www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org. 
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for a larger government. This is illustrated in the consistent representation of some countries 
with high tax and public expenditure levels at the top of the human development, happiness 
and better life indices. 
 
Figure 3 presents the HDI rankings for selected countries in 2015, enabling comparison with 
Figures 1 and 2, with the addition of the six countries in the “top 5” HDI: the high-taxing Nordic 
countries Norway and Denmark; relatively high-taxing Switzerland and Germany; medium-
taxing Australia; and relatively low-taxing Singapore. (see section 3.1 on tax levels). The 
United States ranks tenth on the HDI, with Canada, although it has dramatically higher GDP 
per capita than any other country. 
 
 
Despite the limitations of all comparative indices, a consistent gap appears between 
developed (especially very rich) countries and developing (especially very poor) countries. In 
the HDI, Liberia and Ghana have less than half the human development level achieved by 
Canada, the United States, Australia and Norway. This is consistent with the very low GDP 
per capita of Liberia and Ghana. While there is diversity among rich countries, they all achieve 
a similar ranking on this aggregate statistic. 
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3. Economic Growth, Redistribution and Taxes 
3.1. Growing the pie 
 
The question of why some countries are rich and other countries are poor is a founding 
question of economics that dates at least to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.8 However, the 
question of redistribution between rich and poor countries would likely have made no sense 
to him. Smith saw the main goal of political economy as to build the wealth of one’s own 
country, thereby enriching both the people and the sovereign.9 At least, in the new approach 
of gains from trade, this might also enable other countries to becoming wealthier, thereby 
enhancing the wealth, or economic growth, of all countries. However, any redistribution 
between rich and poor would remain solely the responsibility of the sovereign within the 
country.  
 
In respect of poverty, “redistribution” usually refers to whether a person, or a country attains 
a baseline level of income or wealth, which could be defined in absolute or relative terms. To 
end poverty, it may not be necessary to take from anyone else. At this point, it is useful to 
distinguish the goal of economic growth from redistribution as such. A strategy to end poverty 
is what economists would term a Pareto-improvement in income or wealth, that is, to “grow 
the pie” such that even the poor obtain a sufficient share of the growth to reach the baseline.  
 
However, we may not accept that relying on market outcomes is enough to address poverty, 
so some form of redistribution is required. Moreover, we might also care about inequality of 
income, wealth or other measure of wellbeing. To address either poverty or inequality may 
therefore require some level of “taking” from the rich to give to the poor. Redistribution to 
address inequality might be considered important as a goal in itself, or because unlike the 
classic idea of a trade-off between growth and redistribution, addressing inequality is seem 
as instrumental to achieving growth.10  
 
In a global context, measured by some benchmark, we may argue that individuals, or 
countries, are entitled to a “fair share” of income, wealth, or the benefits of global economic 
growth. Nonetheless, we still perceive both economic growth (growing the pie) and 
redistribution as primarily tasks for governments acting within or for their own countries. 
                                                 
 
8. A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations (1776), available in full text at 
www.econlib.org. 
9. Id. 
10 . Classical economics assumes a trade-off between growth (efficiency) and redistribution (equity), and 
further that market outcomes are the job of economics and distribution is the job of politics; however, more 
recent economic analysis acknowledges the endogeneity of inequality and growth and the role of government 
institutions. The relationship between growth and inequality is increasingly debated; see classically S. 
Kuznets, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality” American Economic Review XLV (1955) 1-28; and 
OECD, Economic Policy Reforms 2012: Going for Growth (OECD 2012), Chapter 5, “Reducing income 
inequality while boosting economic growth: can it be done?”. 
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However, as discussed further in part 5 below, in the international context, the term  
“redistribution” has been applied to tax bases. The concept of inter-nation equity pioneered 
by Peggy and Richard Musgrave (1972)11 implies that countries have an entitlement to a tax 
base, perhaps because of the location of business activity in a country or the benefits of 
investment. In this context, “redistribution” may be required if it is perceived that international 
tax settings lead to an “unfair” distribution of the tax base.  
 
The global economic development discourse that underpins the SDGs takes the approach 
that economic growth is still the main anti-poverty strategy. That is, poor countries should 
“develop” their way out of poverty – just as, it seems, rich countries did. This strategy relies 
on the market to lift incomes, including mechanisms to deliver an increased return to workers 
in wages (rather than to capital, or profits) and to consumers in lower prices and more and 
better consumption goods. 
 
The financing for development project that has accompanied the economic development 
agenda also calls for poor countries to raise taxes. The aim is to enhance domestic revenue 
mobilization which is said to support both economic growth and the reduction of poverty.12 
Thus, in 2001, the UN High-Level Panel on Financing for Development said: 
 
The primary responsibility for achieving growth and equitable development lies with 
the developing countries themselves ... . Financing an adequate level of social public 
expenditure while limiting budget deficits calls for substantial tax revenues. Most 
countries of the developing world must undertake significant tax reforms if they are to 
raise the additional revenue that they need. …13 
 
A similar message is in the UN Financing for Development report of 2017 about the SDGs:  
 
For all countries, public policies and the mobilization and effective use of domestic 
resources, underscored by the principle of national ownership, are central to our 
common pursuit of sustainable development, including achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals [SDGs]. We recognize that domestic resources are first and 
foremost generated by economic growth, supported by an enabling environment at all 
levels.14 
                                                 
 
11. R.A. Musgrave & P.B. Musgrave, International Equity, in Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays in Honor of 
Carl S Shoup p. 63 (R.M. Bird & J.G. Head eds., U. of Toronto Press 1972); P.B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, 
Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation, 26 Brooklyn J. Intl. L. 4 p. 1335 (2001). 
12. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Financing for Development (UN), 
available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/index.html. 
13. UN High-Level Panel on Financing for Development, Report of the High-Level Panel on Financing for 
Development: Recommendations, at paras. 3, 13 and 15 (UN 2001), delivered to the General Assembly, UN 
Doc. A/55/1000 (2001). 
14. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Economic and Social Council forum on 
financing for development follow-up, E.FFDF/2017/3 para. 9 (8 June 2017). 
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The most common, although simplistic, comparative tax measure builds on the GDP indicator 
discussed above: the tax to GDP ratio or “tax level”. 
 
 
As economic growth occurred in countries (they became richer), tax levels increased. In 
general, poor countries have lower tax levels than rich countries. Figure 4 presents the tax 
levels for selected countries including those represented in the above Figures 1 to 3. It also 
shows significant variation in tax levels; clearly, taxation is not the whole story. The causal 
relationship between tax level and economic growth is even less well understood. Overall, 
poor countries do show a slow trend upward in their tax levels over the last few decades. 
However, this has proven very challenging and in many developing countries, revenues 
remain stuck at a stubbornly low fraction of GDP even as growth has increased significantly.15 
 
Nonetheless, global economic growth (accompanied by institutional and policy change) has 
dramatically reduced the number and proportion of the global population in extreme 
poverty(leaving aside many caveats about how to measure poverty and about the successes 
and costs, short and long term, of economic development agendas). This is shown in the 
poverty statistics. Figure 5 presents the decline in the poverty headcount ratio, being the 
proportion of the population living on less than USD 1.90 per day in purchasing power parity 
dollars, by region since 1990. 
                                                 
 
15. See, e.g OECD, Tax Statistics in Asian Countries, Figure 1.4, Tax to GDP ratios, 1990-2014 (OECD). 
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The role of tax in achieving economic development has been long debated and the 
recommended tax policies have changed over time.16 However, it is accepted that taxes are 
needed to raise public finance for infrastructure, market institutions and redistribution. The 
post-colonial consensus in the 1950s and 1960s proposed that tax policy should ensure 
protection of domestic industry and provide favourable tax regimes for it, as well as building 
progressive taxes specifically to redistribute from rich to poor within developing countries. In 
the 1980s to 2000s, tax policy to encourage economic development shifted towards 
recommending enactment of the value added tax; low, flat rate broad-based corporate and 
personal income taxes, “neutrality” of taxes with respect to market activities and the gradual 
reduction and planned elimination of tariffs to support free trade. Progressivity was 
considered less important and even a hindrance to growth. 
 
Can we talk of redistribution between rich and poor countries in sharing the benefits of 
economic growth? Perhaps, the most that can be argued is that rich countries have 
obligations, which may be established through the international institutions, to set framework 
conditions, transition rules and tax policy to support economic development in poor countries. 
That is, rich countries (including former colonial powers) have an obligation to help poor 
countries to develop; to stop exploiting poor countries; and to provide access to a fair share 
                                                 
 
16. See, among a large literature, R.M. Bird, Tax Policy and Economic Development (The Johns Hopkins 
U. Press 1991) and OECD, Tax and Development Programme (OECD), available at www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-
global/tax-and-development.htm. I have discussed this elsewhere, for example, in M. Stewart, Global 
Trajectories of Tax Reform: Mapping Tax Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 Harvard Intl. L. 
J. 1, pp. 170-172 (2003). 
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of economic growth through investment, debt capital and trade. Poor countries could also be 
assisted by being given access to decision-making in international institutions that help 
establish the levers of economic growth; and provided with trade concessions; permission to 
maintain tariffs and protection; and concessional tax treaty rules. Nonetheless, all of these 
obligations still assume that economic development takes place in a statist, or, frame of 
reference and remains the obligation of the nation-state. They are not about redistribution 
between countries. Nor are they about “sharing” a global tax base. 
 
3.2. The raison d’etre of the state 
 
It is arguable that redistribution is the raison d’etre of contemporary governments.17 The 
contemporary “tax state” developed over the last two centuries has a capability unique in 
recorded history to manage mass redistribution from rich to poor. The power to tax and deliver 
social spending became a defining characteristic of democratic governments in the 20th 
century.18 Ideas about, and capability to do, redistribution through fiscal policy evolved from 
the 19th century especially in the German states, where the specialist subject of public 
finance for “communal wants” became known as Finanzwissenschaft and was influential 
around the world.19 At the end of the nineteenth century, Adolph Wagner (1883; 1954) 
argued: 
 
[Taxation] ... can become a regulating factor in the distribution of national income and 
wealth, generally by modifying the distribution brought about by free competition ... 
this second, regulatory purpose to interference with the uses of individual incomes and 
wealth ... leads to an extended, or if preferred, a second conception of taxation. This 
is a ‘social welfare’ concept beside the ‘purely financial’ one.20 
 
In the United States, Seligman21 and later Simons22 argued for the progressive income tax 
as a key instrument for redistribution. However, there were doubts. Joseph Schumpeter wrote 
in 1918 about the potential collapse of the tax state in the face of increasing social demands: 
While the tax state has been able to survive rising costs of administration and war, 
changing attitudes towards property and demands for social expenditures offer a more 
                                                 
 
17. As noted above, politics or government is the domain of redistribution. Other purposes of government 
include, of course, national security. Less benevolently, the state could be coercive and rapacious, aiming to 
extract as many resources as possible for the benefit of the leader or the few, see, for example, M. Levi, Of 
Rule and Revenue (U. Cal. Press 1989). 
18. J. Campbell, The State and Fiscal Sociology, 19 Annual Rev. Sociology p. 163 (1993) and A. Gould & 
P. Baker, Democracy and Taxation, 5 Annual Rev. Political Sci. p. 87 (2005). 
19. See, e.g., the Irish economists C.F. Bastable, Public Finance, 3rd edn. ch. II., p. 15 (Macmillan, 1892 
& 1917), available at www.econlib.org, who discusses the German scholarship in detail. 
20. A. Wagner, Three Extracts on Public Finance, in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance p. 89 (R.A. 
Musgrave & A.T. Peacock eds., Palgrave MacMillan (1883; 1954). 
21. E.R.A. Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 2nd edn. (Princeton U. Press 1908). 
22. H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (U. Chicago Press 1938). 
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ominous signal for its future. These may generate a crisis which the tax state cannot 
survive.23 
 
By the second half of the 20th century, it appeared that the “tax state” had triumphed in its 
redistributive aims. As Richard Musgrave (2000) observed:  
 
[T]he western world saw the typical state share in GNP rise from 20 to over 40 percent. 
In part this reflected rising military budgets, but more importantly the growth of social 
programs to serve the interests of lower and middle income groups. The propertied 
class did not dominate voting rights and, in strategic areas, even sponsored the 
infusion of social concern into the market system. By and large, the rise in 
expenditures was matched by rising tax revenue; and where instances of over-
indebtedness led to fiscal collapse (typically as the product of war finance), that crisis 
was soon liquidated by bankruptcy and inflation. Thereafter, the capitalist system with 
its tax state reemerged none the worse.24 
 
Today, we can identify four modes of fiscal policy addressing redistribution between rich and 
poor within countries. To identify these common modes of redistribution is not to say that all 
countries are the same. However, all successful tax states manage these four modes of 
redistribution to a varying extent. Of course, all law and policy has distributional effects and 
other institutions and regulatory functions that may have a particularly significant effect on 
redistribution are immigration policy; wages and work policy; and land regulation. 
 
3.2.1 Public goods 
 
Richard Musgrave described the provision of public goods as a function of the “allocation” 
branch of government.25 It is usually treated as distinct from redistribution, but I would argue 
that the provision of public goods delivers importantly on redistribution. It can significantly 
support poverty relief in an economic development context, as advocated in the SDG agenda. 
Even if funded by a proportional (flat) tax rather than by progressive taxation, as proposed by 
Musgrave (1959), those with more income pay for more of the cost of public goods than those 
with less and wide benefits are achieved.  
 
                                                 
 
23. J.A. Schumpeter, The Crisis of the Tax State, in Musgrave & Peacock, supra n. 20. 
24. R.A. Musgrave, Public Finance in a Democratic Society vol. 3 p. 101 (Edward Elgar 2000). See also 
V. Tanzi & L Schuknecht, Public Spending in the 20th Century (Cambridge U. Press 2000) and K. Messere, 
The Tax System in Industrialised Countries (Kluwer 1993). The history of this fiscal state is explained by 
many, including A. Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State (Cambridge U. Press 2014). 
25. R.A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York, McGraw-Hill 1959). 
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Musgrave (1959) also referred to merit goods,26 which provide benefits to individuals or 
households funded or delivered by government. These, I would argue, are today better 
considered as public or social goods. The rather narrow economic definition of a public good 
as non-rival and non-excludible, and solely for collective consumption, such as law and order 
and defence, comprises from 10 to 20 per cent of the expenditure of rich country 
governments. Instead, expenditures on health, housing and education are by far the most 
substantial, fiscally costly and widely distributed public goods in these countries, comprising 
as much or more than 30 per cent of OECD member state budgets.27 
 
3.2.2 Progressive Taxes and Transfer Systems 
 
The use of taxes and cash transfer (welfare or social protection) systems to “regulate” the 
market distribution of income and wealth is a second crucial mode of redistribution within 
countries. This redistributive technique is inter-personal, but relies on the state to mediate 
between individuals and families who are identified through various criteria of eligibility, and 
need. Musgrave (1959) described this as the “distribution” branch of government, which 
would often be financed by progressive taxes or have means tested cash benefits based on 
need. It is much less effective in redistributing or regulating the distribution of wealth. Today, 
social protection or cash transfers average more than 30 per cent of OECD member state 
budgets (ranging from about 20 per cent in Korea to nearly 45 per cent in Finland).28 
 
The level of redistribution achieved through tax and transfer systems within countries is 
usually presented by examining the Gini coefficient of a country for disposable income (after 
taxes and transfers have applied). The disposable income Gini for OECD member countries 
is shown in Figure 6 (the lower the Gini, the more equal the disposable income distribution). 
Income inequality has risen in the last two decades but tax and transfer systems still have 
substantial income equalizing effects in most OECD member countries, offsetting about two 
thirds of market inequality in household income.29 
 
                                                 
 
26  Ibid. 
27 OECD, Structure of General Government Expenditures by Function,  
Government at a Glance, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2017-en (13 July 2017). 
28 Ibid. 
29. C. Wang, K. Caminada & K. Goudswaard, Income redistribution in 20 countries over time, 23 Intl. J 
Soc. Welfare 3, pp. 262-275 (2014). 
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Some countries rely more substantially on highly progressive tax-transfer systems than 
others. As an example, Australia has the most “redistributive” tax and transfer system of any 
OECD country, because it relies more on need-based cash transfers and progressive income 
tax and less on insurance-style wage based systems than most other countries.30 However, 
as indicated by Figure 6, Australia is not the most equal society in the world by disposable 
income: That award goes to the relatively high taxing and high spending Nordic states, which 
have more universal public cash payments, goods and services. 
 
3.2.3 Charity 
 
A third mode of redistribution at the national level is charity or philanthropy, which has older 
antecedents than governmental redistribution. Charity continues to play a significant role but, 
at least in rich countries, it is significantly intertwined with state-based mechanisms for 
redistribution. Poor relief and homelessness services, for example, are often delivered by 
charities, but these days they are substantially funded by government. In some countries, 
such as the United States, private philanthropy plays a large role in the delivery of some kinds 
of public goods – higher education is an example – although the (re)distribution of these 
public goods may be somewhat doubted, given the benefit derived by high income earners 
                                                 
 
30. P. Whiteford, Social security and welfare spending in Australia: Assessing long-term trends Tax & 
Transfer Policy Inst. Policy Br. 1/2017 (July 2017), especially Figure 25, available at 
https://taxpolicy.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/taxstudies_crawford_anu_edu_au/2017-
07/combined_pdf_whiteford_trends_in_soc_sec_spending_2017.pdf. 
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from them. In other countries, such as Australia, private and historically religious-based 
schools and hospitals make up about one third of total service delivery. The state subsidises 
these privately delivered services, spending nearly as much on them as on public services. 
 
3.2.4 Fiscal equalization and sharing tax bases 
 
Most countries apply (more or less effectively) some kind of fiscal equalization process to 
redistribute government revenues from one region to another (horizontally) or from one level 
of government to other (vertically).31 Even in unitary states that are not formal federations, 
governments redistribute revenues across rich and poor regions, states, areas and local 
governments. 
 
The forms of fiscal equalization vary widely. They include mechanisms for allocation of tax 
bases to different levels of government within countries and formula based or ad hoc grants 
or revenue distribution processes among poor(er) and rich(er) regions, provinces or local 
governments. In constitutional federations such as Germany, Australia and Canada, fiscal 
equalization may be highly regimented and formal. In other countries, it may be depend more 
on historical factors to do with resources and the allocation of tax bases. In many poor 
countries, it is done poorly or not at all, likely contributing to regional or ethnic strife, or even 
civil war, where some regions are much poorer than others.32 
 
4. Modes of Global Redistribution 
 
While the nation-state remains of central importance in economic development and 
redistribution, there are various international modes of “redistribution” between countries. 
These parallel, to some degree, the four modes of redistribution within countries outlined in 
section 3. These include the provision of international public goods, international aid, global 
philanthropy and the allocation of tax bases across borders in the international tax regime. 
 
 
                                                 
 
31. See, for example, C. Dziobek, C. Gutierrez Mangas & P. Kufa, Measuring Fiscal Decentralisation – 
Exploring the IMF’s Databases, IMF Working Paper WP/11/126 (2011) and OECD, Fiscal Federalism 2016, A 
bird’s eye view of fiscal decentralisation, (OECD 2016), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264254053-
3-en and www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/fiscal-federalism-2016/a-bird-s-eye-
view-of-fiscal-decentralisation_9789264254053-3-en#.WnaHLDeYPcs. 
32 .See, e.g., analysis of the troubling ethnic conflict in Myanmar as a function of regional inequalities and a 
failure to establish regional resource revenue sharing: A. Bauer and M. H. Aung, Could Natural Resource 
Revenue Sharing Help Secure Peace in Myanmar? https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/could-natural-
resource-revenue-sharing-help-secure-peace-myanmar (27 August 2015). 
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4.1. International public goods 
 
A wide variety of international institutions and cooperation provide what could be termed 
international public goods.33 This includes the framework rules and conditions that support 
(on the whole) global economic trade and investment and the many treaties and institutions 
governing everything from the laws of war to postal services to air traffic control, from sea 
beds to heritage (most recently, pizza making),34 wild animals to climate change. These 
regimes are important for global economic growth and wellbeing and they also contribute to 
“redistribute” from rich countries to poor countries. Some of these programmes inevitably 
benefit poor countries much more directly than rich countries, as the latter manage this public 
good provision domestically through their own laws and government spending. For example, 
public health activities of the World Health Organization (WHO), such as disease eradication 
programmes, benefit everyone but are focused primarily on poor countries, thereby having a 
beneficial redistributive effect.35 
 
However, if we take a broader view of the role of government in delivering merit goods such 
as health and education, or social protection systems, within countries as a benchmark, it 
seems obvious that the delivery of international public goods has scarcely reached its 
potential. It seems that we fail, as much as we succeed, in obtaining international cooperation 
or delivery of committed funds to deliver even minimal global public goods, while almost no 
redistribution of income or wealth is achieved. Moreover, the financing of such international 
public goods has not been achieved by global taxes, or even, in many cases, by national 
taxes or adequate sharing of tax revenues. 
 
4.2. International aid 
 
The main mode of direct redistribution from rich to poor countries to deliver what could be 
considered merit goods is the international regimes for aid, disaster relief, concessional or 
low interest debt financing and debt relief, and supplementary provision of services such as 
technical assistance between governments. Foreign aid has become increasingly well 
organized as Official Development Assistance (ODA) delivered either bilaterally or through a 
multilateral development agency.36 International concessional lending and debt relief may be 
bilateral or from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, or regional 
development banks. 
                                                 
 
33. See, e.g., International Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement and Financing (M. Ferroni & A. Mody 
eds., World Bank 2002) and I. Kaul, I. Grunberg & M. Stern, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in 
the 21st Century (Oxford U. Press; United Nations Development Programme, 2003). 
34. UNESCO, Intangible Cultural Heritage, Art of Neoapolitan ‘Pizzaiuolo’,  Available at 
https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/art-of-neapolitan-pizzaiuolo-00722 .  
35. WHO, Who we are, what we do, available at www.who.int/about/en/. 
36. OECD, Official development assistance - definition and coverage (OECD), available at 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm. 
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In total, ODA amounted to USD 130 billion in 2015.37 This is a small proportion of rich country 
budgets. In dollar terms, the United States was the biggest donor in 2015 (USD 30 billion), 
but as a proportion of GNI, Sweden was the largest donor (1.41% of GDP).38 However, 
foreign aid can be large relative to poor country national income or budgets, where it may 
drastically outweigh tax revenues. In recent years, Liberia, one of the poorest countries in the 
world as indicated in Figure 1, relied most heavily on ODA, receiving 176% of its GNI in aid.39 
The interaction between foreign aid and recipient country budgets may be difficult, however, 
as many donor countries (and private donors) seek to directly control expenditure of aid on 
specific projects. Where this occurs, ODA bypasses the recipient country budget and is 
therefore not really a country to country redistribution.  
 
4.3. International philanthropy 
 
International philanthropy operates in two ways: (1) activities across borders by charities; and 
(2) charitable gifts across borders (philanthropy). The international charitable and donative 
framework operates in close relationship to the political and taxing domain of the state, as 
well as to private returns achieved by individuals in the global market. This relationship may 
be illustrated by the title of a recent bestseller, Philanthrocapitalism: How Giving Can Save 
the World.40 
 
Although depending on national or state based laws, international not-for-profit (NFP) or 
charitable activity at times appears more flexible than state aid in achieving “redistribution” 
across borders. There is evidence that both international charity and philanthropy have 
increased dramatically in recent decades. In 2012, the OECD launched a global network of 
foundations for development.41 Some forms of international public goods, such as vaccination 
                                                 
 
37. OECD, Final Official Development Assistance Figures in 2015 (OECD), available at 
www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/final-oda-2015.htm. See 
also OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries (OECD 2017), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fin_flows_dev-2017-en-fr. 
38. OECD, Final Official Development Assistance Figures in 2015, supra n. 34 and Geographical 
Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, supra n. 34. See also J. Myer, Foreign aid: These 
countries are the most generous, World Economic Forum (19 Aug. 2016), available at 
www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/08/foreign-aid-these-countries-are-the-most-generous/. 
39. L.-A. Pilapil, Top 10 countries with the highest ODA to GNI ratio, devex (6 Feb. 2012), available at 
www.devex.com/news/top-10-countries-with-the-highest-oda-to-gni-ratio-77423. 
40. M. Bishop & M. Green, Philanthrocapitalism: How Giving Can Save the World (Bloomsbury Press 
2009). I discuss the intersection of market and state in international philanthropy in M. Stewart The 
Boundaries of Charity and Tax in M. Harding, A. O’Connell and M. Stewart (eds) Not for profit law: Theoretical 
and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge) 232-253  (2014). 
41. Global Network of Foundations Working for Development, About Us, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/site/netfwd/  ; M. Edwards, The Role and Limitations of Philanthropy, Commissioned 
Paper, Bellagio Initiative (Nov. 2011); OECD, Philanthropic Foundations and Development Cooperation, 4 
DAC Journal 3, p. 73 (2003). 
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or seeking to eradicate malaria or HIV, are currently being substantially delivered by private 
philanthropy, in cooperation with global institutions and national governments.42 
 
The growth in international charity and philanthropy is a part of what has been called a “global 
associational revolution”.43 This growth may have been prompted by an apparent “crisis” of 
nation states “to cope on [their] own with the social welfare, developmental, and 
environmental problems that face nations today”, as well as being stimulated by enhanced 
communications and an expansion in the middle class in many countries.44 Transnational 
charities and other NFP organizations also seem to be growing as key institutions in 
international civil society, with the goal of counteracting directly the neoliberal economic 
discourse of globalization and of enhancing distributional justice and a diversity of voices in 
international policy.45 
 
4.4. International allocation of the tax base 
 
Ilan Benshalom (2014) plausibly argues that direct redistribution between countries cannot 
be achieved at scale, pointing to the great challenges (and frequent failures) of international 
aid as evidence of this.46 Benshalom argues that global redistribution – which he describes 
(without specifically defining this) as wealth distribution – must be achieved indirectly through 
various framework, economic or institutional changes. A key such institution that he identifies 
is international taxation, in particular the allocation of the right to tax. 
 
Can the long-standing international regime for the allocation of jurisdiction to tax on the bases 
of residence and source be considered as a mode of distribution between countries? In 
superficial ways, the allocation of the tax base is analogous to the allocation of tax bases to 
different levels of government in a federation. However, it is quite different in distributional 
effect. This is because there is no overarching equalizing global mechanism to moderate the 
distributional effects of tax jurisdiction through the other domestic modes of redistribution 
summarized in section 3. As Tsilly Dagan (2018) observes, the international tax regime is 
fully decentralized.47 
 
                                                 
 
42. See, e.g. the goal of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to eradicate polio: 
www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Development/Vaccine-Delivery. 
43. L.M. Salamon et al., Civil Society in Comparative Perspective, in Global Civil Society: Dimensions of 
the Nonprofit Sector pp. 3 and 4 (L.M. Salamon et al. eds., John Hopkins Ctr. for Civ. Socy. Stud. 1999) and 
I.A. Koele, International Taxation of Philanthropy p. 4 (IBFD 2007), Online Books IBFD. 
44. Salamon et al., supra n. 48, at p. 4. 
45. Id. 
46. I. Benshalom, How to redistribute? A critical examination of mechanisms to promote global wealth 
distribution 64 U. Toronto L. J. (2014). DOI: 10.3138/utlj.0717. 
47. T. Dagan, International Tax Policy: Between Competition and Cooperation p. 3 (Cambridge U. Press 
2018). 
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However, in her celebrated work on inter-nation equity, Peggy Musgrave (2001) has argued 
that the international tax system – both residence and source principles – is specifically about 
redistribution, both domestically and between nations.48 She argues that the residence basis, 
at least for individuals, but also for corporations as important intermediary entities, is 
necessary for countries to protect horizontal and vertical equity in their domestic income tax. 
Moreover, investment capital especially in intangibles, and highly skilled and high wealth 
individuals, are much more likely to be mobile and so, as Kim Brooks (2009) suggests, 
ignoring equity in international taxation misses inter-individual equity issues within 
countries.49 On this analysis, the rules of international tax allocation support national 
redistribution within countries, rather than being about redistribution between countries. 
 
However, the source basis for taxation of economic activity remains, as P. Musgrave claims 
it to be, a foundation of inter-country distribution. The source basis is the “bedrock of most 
international tax treaties” with clear relevance to distribution between rich and poor countries: 
 
This permits a country to share in the gains of foreign-owned factors of production 
operating within its borders; gains which are generated in cooperation with its own 
factors, whether they be natural resources, an education and/or low-cost work force, 
or the proximity of a market. The tax revenue so obtained may be thought of as a 
national return to the leasing of these complementary factors to non-resident investors 
or temporary workers, or, such taxation may be thought of in benefit terms, as a quid 
pro quo payment for cost-reducing, profit-enhancing services provided by the host 
country.50 
 
The territorial or economic connection approach to allocating tax jurisdiction still “works” for 
many kinds of tax, whether on income, wealth or consumption. Most of us and our economic 
activities including earning wages, conducting business activities and consuming goods and 
services remain territorially grounded even in a global era. However, as is well known and 
discussed in other issues in this volume (so I will not rehearse it here), digital global 
capitalism, multinational value chains and entity control across tax havens contribute to base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) and fundamentally challenge this traditional approach to 
tax allocation.  
 
Peggy Musgrave (2001) argued for increased levels of international coordination to achieve 
inter-nation equity at least in corporate taxation, for example, setting a basic corporate tax 
rate and sharing revenues through formulary apportionment.51 On the other hand, some have 
                                                 
 
48. P. Musgrave, supra n. 4 and R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, supra n. 4. See also N.H. Kaufman, 
Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 L.& Policy Intl. Bus. 2, p. 145 (1998). 
49. K. Brooks, Global Distributive Justice: The Potential for a Feminist Analysis of International Tax 
Revenue Allocation 21 Can. J. Women & L. Issue 2, p. 289 (2009). 
50. P. Musgrave, supra n. 4, at pp. 1341-1342. 
51. P. Musgrave, supra n. 4. 
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suggested that the entitlement or economic allegiance approach to tax allocation cannot be 
supported on moral distributional grounds under benefit, communitarian or voluntarist political 
theories, in part because nation-state borders do not align with or justify any morally relevant 
group for redistribution.52 
 
A key challenge to a “fair” inter-nation allocation of the tax base on the source basis is, as P. 
Musgrave (2001) acknowledged, global competition of nations through tax and other 
policies.53 The international allocation of the tax base interacts with the competitive drive for 
economic growth and harnessing a share of global economic growth through investment. 
Thus, while it is likely that base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) harms poor countries more 
than rich countries, and this can be addressed to some extent by international tax reforms 
and better administration as proposed by the OECD BEPS project, it is also the case that 
poor countries frequently do not fully exercise their jurisdiction to tax foreign investment. 
Despite the importance of corporate tax for poor countries, the evidence is that increasingly, 
corporate tax revenues are given away in tax incentives that narrow the base, and in lower 
tax rates, poor administration or special deals.54 
 
5. Rethinking Tax and Redistribution 
5.1. The right question? 
 
Are we asking the right question, being about redistribution between rich and poor countries? 
Some have suggested that fairness in the international tax context has no meaning, or at 
least, is a blurry and contested concept.55 According to the SDGs, we should be concerned 
about people not countries: the huddled masses, the poor compared to the rich and growing 
inequality between rich and poor people.  
 
However, it is difficult for tax policy to move beyond the statist view of international taxation. 
Tax law remains national or sovereign law. Any cooperation between states is intended 
to help collect national tax revenues or to bolster national tax sovereignty. This statist 
view is only reinforced by the acknowledgement of a global commons of the oceans, 
Antarctica and space outside the territorial boundaries of states. 
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53. P. Musgrave, supra n. 4. 
54. See, for example, L. Abramovsky, A. Klemm & D. Phillips, Corporate Tax in Developing Countries: 
Current Trends and Design Issues, 35 Fiscal Stud. 4, pp. 559-584 (2014). L.  Schoueri argues forcefully that 
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Meaning? 45 Intertax 12, p. 767 (2017). 
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As well as having a monopoly on taxing power, the state also limits redistribution, as much 
as it delivers it and thereby control the extent and pattern of distribution between rich and 
poor people. There is more attention than ever being paid to these boundaries, which are not 
always aligned with territorial or citizenship concepts, to identify who is “in” and who is “out” 
for purposes of tax, social welfare and entitlement to merit goods such as healthcare. This is 
increasingly important as countries may be facing increasing fiscal challenges in preventing 
poverty and addressing inequality. 
5.2. Reframing the question 
 
Dagan (2013) suggests that nations are facing “tragic choices” between redistribution and 
tax competition.56 A similar view of this “tragedy” is suggested by Walter Scheidel (2017), 
who claims that history shows that the biggest drivers of reduced inequality have been war 
and disaster and who doubts the ability of governments to counter it: 
 
Even the most progressive welfare states of continental Europe are now struggling to 
compensate for the widening income disparities that exist before taxes and transfers. 
In the coming decades, the dramatic aging of rich countries and the pressures of 
immigration on social solidarity will make it ever harder to ensure a fairly equitable 
distribution of net incomes.57 
 
Unfortunately, simply “sharing” the tax jurisdiction between states, even fairly and in 
accordance with inter-nation equity, will not necessarily lead to greater redistribution between 
rich and poor. There is little sign of the increased coordination in fundamental tax rules and 
a harmonised tax rate, which Peggy Musgrave (2001) sought. 
 
One new approach to this dilemma is proposed by Dagan (2018) who re-examines the 
challenge of competition and the goal of coordination to understand and weigh the welfare 
outcomes of both options better. She advocates improving tax competition, by establishing 
fair rules of the game. This approach recognises the global challenge for justice, and presents 
a new kind of statist solution, relying on governments to continue managing redistribution 
within their borders. Dagan also proposes establishing genuine transfers of income between 
rich and poor countries, as a possible element of this system. This requires global 
governance, but to obtain greater gains from tax competition, not to eliminate it.58  
 
Another approach is to move beyond, or insert ourselves into the nation-state in order to 
reconsider redistribution. This could be a matter of framing. It is a cliché that globalization is 
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causing national boundaries of states (and economies) to weaken, so that we come to see 
ourselves as directly, rather than indirectly, connected to the global economy, or across 
borders to multiple jurisdictions.59 The national frame of reference for growth and 
redistribution has been termed by Nancy Fraser (2005) the “Keynesian-Westphalian frame”.60 
This phrase refers to the boundaries of the sovereign61 state at international law and to its 
economic character, relying on taxation to fund social welfare and playing an interventionist 
role through fiscal policy in the national economy. Fraser (2005) calls for us to “reframe” 
debates about fundamental questions of redistribution (distributive justice) and 
representation (democratic citizenship) to take account of globalization. This hints at a 
reconfiguration of the political and economic boundaries of the state, but does not take it 
much further. 
 
A third alternative to a statist approach is the turn to cosmopolitanism. There is a significant 
moral and ethical debate between “cosmopolitans” who argue for people as individuals as 
the basis for determining global distributive justice, compared to a Rawlsian position of 
“peoples”, that is, nation-states.62 There are various reasons why cosmopolitans call for us 
to move beyond states, but we can highlight two concerns. First, countries (governments) 
might actually work against the pursuit of global redistribution, or they may (and undoubtedly 
in some cases do) actually cause poverty and inequality. Second, as suggested by Dagan 
and Scheidel, countries may be increasingly unable to achieve redistribution, as they face 
the realities of globalization. 
 
Cosmopolitans such as Thomas Pogge (2011) and Gillian Brock (2006)63 see the importance 
of taxation and argue for international tax mechanisms to achieve redistribution between rich 
and poor, including cooperation and global taxes. However, unlike Peggy Musgrave (2001), 
the goal is not redistribution between rich and poor countries. Rather, it is the use of whatever 
mechanisms are available to achieve redistribution between rich and poor people. While 
redistribution between people may be the motivation, however, cosmopolitans must face the 
reality already discussed: the legal and political mechanisms of taxation and social welfare 
are state-based. Thomas Nagel (2005) presents a nuanced examination of this challenge to 
theories of global justice and argues persuasively that the nation-state remains “the primary 
locus of political legitimacy and the pursuit of justice”.64 At least, we can accept that the 
nation-state has both a legitimate claim and viable institutions to achieve redistribution. 
                                                 
 
59. W. Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory pp. 7-8 (Cambridge U. Press 2000) and S. Sassen, 
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Some argue that unsettling the state-based taxation regime will be very difficult or that it 
requires a very significant alteration of the political dynamics.65 This is evidenced by failures 
to date. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos (2000) nearly 20 years ago identified the failures 
of the international tax regime compared to other forms of international regulation, 
comprising “polycentric, regulatory diversity” between “rogue fiscal sovereigns”, constantly 
out-played by the “monocentric complexity” of multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating 
globally.66 We have been recently affronted by the concept of “stateless income”, like outer 
space, unreachable by any taxing state.67 The reaction of governments in the OECD/G20 
BEPS project suggests that this is against the natural order of things. Ironically, the Trump 
tax reform of 2017 may have restored order to this chaos, eliminating “stateless income” by 
ensuring that the United States asserts jurisdiction, or permits another country to have 
jurisdiction, to tax in various situations.68 It also takes us further down the path of 
straightforward international tax competition. 
 
5.3. Towards transnational taxation and redistribution 
 
I suggest that another approach to rethinking redistribution between rich and poor countries 
is to problematize the very concept of a country, that is, what is national and what is 
international in tax and redistribution. The features of sovereignty, or statehood of countries, 
are defined by Saskia Sassen (2008) as territory, authority and rights. Sassen (2008) explains 
that: 
 
a good part of globalization consists of an enormous variety of microprocesses that 
begin to denationalise what had been constructed as national ... They reorient 
particular components of institutions and specific practices – both public and private – 
toward global logics and away from historically shaped national logics.69 
 
Globalizing processes have already unmade and remade aspects of the state, reconfiguring 
territory, authority and rights in new forms. An example is the relationship between countries 
or their governments, and MNEs. This is where taxation, in particular, has garnered public 
attention. Taxation and welfare are tightly connected, or even constitutive of the nation-state 
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(hence, we can call it the “tax state”). Perhaps we can unpack these core functions of the 
state, taking a transnational perspective “to deconstruct the various law-state associations”, 
and thereby changing the boundaries of the state itself.70 What could an approach that 
unpacks the “tax state” and reconsiders it as something else look like? I briefly outline some 
possible options here. 
 
First, the ever-growing space of international tax administrative cooperation has the potential 
to reconfigure national tax bureaucracies towards a new form of global tax bureaucracy. This 
extension of technologies of regulation a c r o s s  b o r d e r s  may have the ultimate effect 
of extending the state’s capacity to govern or else it may disaggregate aspects of the 
democratic “tax state”, reconstituting it in new forms.71 The BEPS project has taken this 
further as Country-by-Country Reporting has now commenced, automatically sharing at least 
some information on MNE profits.72 The EU-MOSS system for collection of VAT also extends 
tax cooperation beyond national borders in new ways.73 
 
Second, it may be feasible – and, indeed, may already be happening in some respects – to 
unpack elements of historically “national” public or merit goods and to finance and deliver this 
through a transnational regime. Consider proposals for “brain drain” taxes.74 For example, 
such a tax could be collected by a country such as Australia, to which individuals migrate 
having completed tertiary studies in a (poorer) developing country such as Papua New 
Guinea. To fund Papua New Guinean education, the brain drain tax that Australia collects 
would be remitted to Papua New Guinea. New Zealand and Australia both have Higher 
Education Contribution Schemes in which university debts are repaid through the tax system 
when students earn enough. Both countries now continue the obligation while their students 
are overseas. This requires cooperation in enforcement; with intergovernmental cooperation 
and the ability to collect and remit tax debts, this is potentially solved. We could take the 
concept further and seek to establish a regional or global public good of higher education, 
financed in a layered way by the countries involved but, of course, mostly by rich countries. 
This proposal takes a “slice” of the tax and redistribution activity of a nation-state and extends 
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it across borders. This is not currently done, but neither is it fanciful in the current political, 
technological, tax and development context. 
 
Is such an approach possible for aspects of international tax itself? The most likely candidate, 
surprisingly given the controversy that surrounds it, could be the corporate tax applicable to 
MNEs. Not so long ago, MNEs were perceived as pioneers or extensions of power from their 
home or resident states, which could lead in delivering shared economic development to that 
home state. That is, a US MNE was perceived as an extension of US state power. Yet today, 
we see as Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) identified, the “monocentric complexity” and power 
of MNEs, leading to the rise of what has been called “functional sovereignty” of the new digital 
capitalist behemoths, such as Amazon.75 The implication is that the locus of power is shifting 
and perhaps, governments will be unable to manage redistribution or regulatory control.  
 
A source, or jurisdictional base, still make sense for many MNEs which have resource, or 
manufacturing operations in a jurisdiction. Although their financial and intellectual property 
aspects are transnational, such MNEs are still arguably under the territorial jurisdiction of the 
particular country in which they operate. However, the MNEs that are the focus of most 
attention are those that own and leverage intangibles globally: Google, Apple, Facebook and 
so on. These MNEs seem to have attained, in the analysis of Sassen (2008), the defining 
sovereign features of territory, authority and rights, in particular by incorporating tax havens 
into themselves.76 
 
As a result of the deterritorialization (and reterritorialization across state borders) of these 
MNEs, the notion of corporate “residence” through incorporation or through the locus of 
management or shareholder ownership and control, seems no longer to be a good basis for 
allocating tax jurisdiction. The various tax definitions of corporate residence – ranging from 
the place of legal incorporation, to concepts of central management and control by directors 
or managers, to identification of majority shareholders or voters (for example, the OECD 
Model;77 various domestic laws) - extend the fiction of location or connection to a jurisdiction 
so as to extend the territorial reach of taxation. At the same time, these elements can be 
manipulated to enable the location of these companies and their allocated income in tax 
havens. Thus, the concept of residence has itself produced new modes of transnational flow 
and location in MNEs and has contributed to the agglomeration of control and distribution of 
the value-chain across the globe. 
 
                                                 
 
75. F. Pasquale, From Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The Case of Amazon, L. & Political Econ. 
Blog, (6 Dec. 2017). 
76. Although this might be expressed by those tax havens themselves as a reassertion of their own 
sovereignty (to have a low taxed jurisdiction that is legitimate): G. Rawlings, Taxes and Transnational 
Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of Offshore Sovereignty, 29 L. & Policy 1, p. 51 (2007). 
77. Most recently, OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (21 Nov. 2017), Models IBFD. 
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The concept of “source” also remains problematic, as identified by many others, although as 
discussed, a core of this concept related to economic activity may still be relatively 
straightforward. However, a “source” basis cannot apply to the deterritorialized elements of 
MNEs. A transnational approach could be to “slice” the MNE “rent” or surplus from its global 
intangible activities and divide this up between nation states. This could be done unilaterally, 
as is proposed by the United Kingdom in its “digital” tax on turnover (which essentially 
abandons source).78 Or, we could consider it as a global resource and seek to develop a 
formula or process for sharing that return. This leads us back to global coordination, as Peggy 
Musgrave (2001) argued, but this time to share benefits derived from global synergies of 
MNEs. 
 
Finally, we should acknowledge the recent proposals for a global tax on wealth, in the context 
of research confirming the role of progressive taxation in redistribution between rich and poor. 
The evidence on world income distribution suggests that the decline in progressive taxation 
since the 1980s towards tax policy aimed primarily at generating economic growth, has 
increased inequality even though, as explained in section 3, we have also reduced global 
poverty.79 Piketty (2014), Zucman (2014) and others who have developed the world top 
incomes and wealth research, have focused our attention on individuals and the income and 
wealth that they control globally. They have called not only for strengthening of national tax 
bases, raising of tax rates in national personal income taxes and the stamping out of tax 
avoidance across countries. They have called specifically for a progressive global wealth tax 
on individuals, to be administered by and through national governments using technological 
platforms and institutions.80 However, simply “taxing” such wealth (even if it were easy) is not 
going to be enough. We really do need to redistribute it, either through public or merit goods 
or through social welfare systems. These proposals leave the redistributive task to 
governments of countries to achieve and do not address redistribution from rich to poor 
across countries. 
6. Some Concluding Thoughts 
 
Neither state-based nor individual-based modes of redistribution between rich and poor are 
fully workable in a global context. Both taxation and redistribution must be mediated through 
processes and institutions; they require legitimate, binding or strongly compelling systems of 
engagement and enforcement. Historically, these systems have crystallised in the nation-
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state. If we are to take the idea of international redistribution seriously, we therefore need to 
unpack the very concept of the “country” (or state) that has at its core, the ability to tax and 
redistribute.  
 
How can we approach this task? We could start by investigating new ways of connecting 
state-based modes of tax and redistribution with rich and poor individuals globally. An 
approach could be to take a “slice” of state-based tax or redistribution and to reconfigure this 
transnationally. We also need to evaluate how global processes are affecting redistribution 
within borders, and vice versa. We see a tentative step in this direction in the new phrasing 
of the SDGs, which aim to promote “shared prosperity” in all countries, through global 
sustainable development.81 The World Bank has now developed a “shared prosperity” 
measure, which relates growth to the benefit to the bottom 40% of the population of a 
particular country, relative to the top 60% in that country. Poverty is measured globally, but 
“shared prosperity” looks at market income of people within countries. An extension would 
seek to evaluate the effects of national tax and redistribution as a part of global policy 
development. 
 
Walter Scheidel’s (2017) pessimistic analysis of redistribution requiring war or disaster 
focuses on nation-states. Perhaps Scheidel underestimates the ability and resilience of 
contemporary tax states to both tax and redistribute. He also does not consider the potential 
to reconfigure tax and redistribution across borders. However, Scheidel’s work does suggest 
that we may be at a new critical juncture and it is the tax state itself that we must reconstitute 
to achieve redistribution between rich and poor. 
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